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INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement. Japan is a major importer of beef. In 1985, the
Japanese imported over 146,000 metric tons of beef. The Japanese beef
market is of particular interest to the United States beef exporters,
because 65 percent of all United States beef exports have gone to Japan
in recent years. In view of the importance of the Japanese beef
market, the degree of competition which exists among exporters in that
market is a concern to any nation currently exporting beef to Japan,
and to nations planning to export to Japan in the future. The degree
of competition in that market will influence trade policy formation in
the U.S. and other exporting countries, because trade policies must be
formulated with as much knowledge about market structure as possible.
Private beef exporting organizations in the U.S. could also benefit
from a better understanding of the competitiveness of the Japanese beef
market. Information about the competitive position of the U.S.
relative to other exporting nations will help private exporters
determine how resources devoted to promotion and product development
can be most efficiently used. To date, however, little information
concerning the overall competitiveness of the Japanese beef market can
be found in the literature.
Purpose and Rationale. The objective of this study is to determine
Japanese market loyalty toward its individual beef suppliers (exporting
countries). Estimated transition probabilities are used to measure
that market loyalty. Information needed to assess the degree of
competitiveness that exists among exporters in the Japanese beef market
is provided in the transition probabilities, because buyer loyalty-
influences market competitiveness. Additionally, per unit beef prices
paid to exporting nations are compared between exporters. This
comparison determines if beef from all exporters is considered
homogeneous, or if the beef from certain exporters is viewed by the
Japanese as distinct from beef imported from other suppliers.
A product market with a high degree of homogeneity and substitut-
ability among the products of all suppliers will likely be more
competitive than a market dominated by dissimilar products that are
poor substitutes for each other. When the imported products from two
suppliers are good substitutes, a rational importer would to pay
approximately the same price to both exporters. If the prices paid to
two exporters are found to be statistically different, the importer
does not consider the two products to be good substitutes. When
products in a market do not substitute well for one another,
competition is reduced.
It is useful to characterize the degree of homogeneity and substi-
tutability that exists in the Japanese beef import market among beef of
different supplier origin through a comparison of beef prices. The
author's hypothesis is that the Japanese view beef imported from the
U.S. as distinct from beef imported from Australia, New Zealand and the
rest of the world. This hypothesis follows from the fact that U.S.
beef is highly marbled, "fed" beef compared to beef from Australia and
New Zealand which has little marbling and is often referred to as
"nonfed" beef.
Importer buying behavior reflects product relationships in that
strong loyalty toward a particular supplier may indicate that a
suitable substitute is unavailable in the marketplace. Further,
importer buying behavior with regard to loyalty toward individual sup-
pliers will influence competitiveness in the marketplace, because such
behavior includes the manifestations of institutional and political
relationships as they exert pressure on the market. Competition in
the market is reduced when institutional and political relationships
cause an importing nation to favor one supplier over another though the
exported products from the two suppliers are homogeneous.
Theil and Rey (1966), Dent (1967) and Wilson et al. (1986) used
buyer transition probabilities to describe buyer behavior. Transition
probabilities reflect a buyers propensity to switch from one supplier
to another. In the context of international trade, transition
probabilities measure the likelihood that an importing nation,
currently buying from a certain exporting country, will switch to a
different supplier in the next time period.
Transition probabilities are a function of relative prices, product
quality and promotion (Telser, 1962). Estimation and analysis of
transition probabilities for an importing country is, thus, a useful
means of characterizing that country's buying behavior, particularly
regarding importer loyalty toward individual suppliers. In the
Japanese imported beef market, estimation of transition probabilities
as a description of Japanese beef buying behavior is helpful as a
first step toward understanding the degree of overall competitiveness
of the market.
Market Environment. Japan's rise to becoming an important partic-
ipant in world beef trade bas its roots in tbe rapid growth of Japanese
per capita meat consumption and in tbe country's geography and size.
There is little doubt that by the mid-1950s the Japanese people were a
meat hungry population (Longworth, 1984). After 1955, mechanization of
rice production reduced the need for draft animals, and large numbers
of cattle were diverted to beef production. Per capita incomes were
also increasing rapidly, and the Japanese people found that they could
afford to purchase meat more often. The upward trend in per capita
meat consumption was especially apparent during the income -doubling
decades of the 1960s and 1970s.
Beginning in the late-1950s, consumption for beef outpaced domestic
beef production and beef imports increased. Limited pasture and forage
area constrained beef production in Japan, which comes primarily from
Wagyu (indigenous Japanese beef cattle), fattened dairy steers and cull
dairy cows. Australia has been Japan's primary beef supplier.
However, in recent years, the U.S. has substantially increased its
share of Japanese beef imports. New Zealand held a large share of the
Japanese beef import market in the early 1960s, but by 1983, that
country held only a small fraction of the market.
Beef importation in Japan is a highly regulated activity.
Substantial political support for the maintenance of agricultural
producer incomes and concern for food security have resulted in a
combination of regulations which have undoubtedly limited Japanese beef
imports. Import quotas, tariffs and import surcharges have protected
domestic livestock producers and led to rising retail beef prices that
have increased at a faster rate than prices for either pork or chicken.
(Figure Nl)
.
Thesis Method. An application of a finite, first order Markov
process is used in this study to develop transition probabilities for
exporting countries' market shares of Japanese beef imports. The
transition probabilities are estimated using an inequality-restricted
estimation based on the Minos quadratic programming algorithm,
transition probabilities are developed for the periods 1960 to 1985 and
1975 to 1985. A comparison of the transition probabilities from the two
periods is used to determine whether Japanese supplier loyalty and the
competitive position Japan's primary beef suppliers changed in the past
decade. Per unit beef prices are also compared between Japanese
supplier countries using a paired t-test. The results are presented
and discussed with special emphasis placed on how the resulting
transition probabilities and per unit price differences (or lack
thereof) among beef suppliers influence the overall competitiveness of
the Japanese beef market.
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JAPAN'S BEEF IMPORT SYSTEM
Beef trade flows between Japan and the United states are influenced
by political, social and economic issues. Liberalization of beef trade
and protection of Japan's livestock industry are considered two
conflicting policy goals. Severe restrictions have been imposed on the
imports of beef into Japan, resulting in substantial social costs.
This restriction is especially severe since the efficiency of Japans
beef production is comparatively low. As a result, the expansion of
beef imports has been a major focus in trade negotiations of Japan with
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
Beef imports are severely restricted to protect inefficient domestic
production. A majority of Wagyu cattle raisers live in the remote,
depopulated areas of Kobe and Matsuzaka. They typically raise a few
head of cattle as a sideline of subsistence farming. Feeding periods
may be as long as 30 - 35 months. The productivity of such operations
is low and the production costs high.
Irrespective of the low production efficiency, raising cattle is a
critical source of income for farmers in these areas. Because
electoral votes in depopulated districts are over represented in the
National Diet, political necessity as well as welfare considerations
require the protection of the domestic beef industry. To protect the
domestic producers, the government supports the domestic wholesale
price of beef within a "price stabilization zone" of floor and ceiling
prices. The policy instrument used to maintain beef prices within the
zone is the control of supply by means of an import quota (Longworth,
1976, 1978).
The Monopoly Model. Japan has created a monopoly in importing beef
through the allocation of import quotas to one trader. Currently, all
beef imports (except about a 10% share of the general quota) are
monopolized by the Livestock Industries Promotion Corporation (LIPC)
.
It is assumed that Japan's objectives in establishing a beef import
monopoly are: (1) to encourage a desired level of domestic production
of beef; (2) to secure a target internal price for beef producers; (3)
to secure a desired degree of protection for domestic producers (ie., a
desired proportionate excess of the price for producers over the
international price of the product)
; (4) to obtain a desired reduction
in the level of imports; and (5) to reserve a specified proportion of
the domestic market for domestic producers (Snape, 1986).
Snape illustrates that a monopolistic importer that seeks to
maximize profits will restrict imports until the marginal cost of
imports is equal to the marginal revenue obtained from selling the
imports on the home market (i.e. after allowing for the response of
domestic producers as well as consumers). This restriction of imports
will raise the domestic price to both producers and consumers and will
encourage domestic production. In Figure Tl , the Japanese beef import
situation is illustrated as a case where the LIPC behaves as a
monopolistic producer and importer under profit maximization. Total
demand is D, MR the marginal revenue, SM the supply of imports, MCM the
marginal cost of imports, and MC the marginal cost of domestic
production MC + MCM is the horizontal sum of the two marginal costs.
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FIGURE T1: Monopolistic Beef Importing
by the Japanese Livestock Industry
Promotion Corporation.
The profit-maximizing configuration is total sales of OA (at a price of
OE)
,
OB being imports (obtained at a price of OC) and domestic supply
being BA (-OF). If the monopoly is created by an import quota, and if
the import quota is greater than OB, then the quota will not be fully
used as only OB will be imported. If the import quota is less than OB,
the quota will be fully used and the monopolist will not have effective
control over imports -control lies with those who determine the size of
the quota.
Trade Agreements in Japanese Beef Trade. Beef trade flows between
Japan and the United States, Australia, and New Zealand are influenced
by political economy issues which determine trade shares. Even with
intense domestic political pressure to protect its domestic
agriculture, Japan participated in the Tokyo Round of Multinational
Trade Negotiations and agreed to a number of agricultural trade
concessions. During bilateral trade agreements with the United States,
Japan agreed to gradually to increase the annual importation of high
quality beef from 16,800 metric tons in 1978 to 39,800 by Japanese
fiscal year 1983 (Lloyd et al
.
, 1987). The agreement left the existing
beef import quota system unchanged as it only increased the proportion
of the quota allocated to high quality beef. This action favored the
United States beef exporter over their Australian and New Zealand
counterparts since the United States dominates high quality beef trade.
Following the Tokyo Round, the United States and Japan held a series
of bilateral negotiation and Gatt Article XIII consultations. The
meetings culminated in April 1984 with a new agreement on beef imports.
This agreement called for a gradual increase of 27,600 metric tons of
high quality beef imports up to an annual import quantity of 58,400 by
1987 (Lloyd et al
.
)
.
Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation. The Livestock Industry
Promotion Corporation (LIPC) is a quasi -government economic corporation
attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)
.
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Its main purpose is to administer price stabilization and deficiency
payment schemes for livestock products. In addition, it is charged
with handling funds for modernization and development of the livestock
industry. Today, LIPC's duties relating to beef as specifically set
forth by law are: (1) price stabilization of livestock products through
the purchase, sale and storage of domestic and imported beef, (2)
direct subsidization or investment in designated assistance projects,
and (3) promotion of demand for livestock products (LIPC, 1983).
The LIPC is empowered by the Japanese Government to purchase,
exchange, sell and store domestic or imported beef for price
stabilization. The Government through the MAFF sets a price
stabilization zone which the LIPC is to maintain. The LIPC can
influence the quantities of beef on the wholesale market through the
purchase and sale of imported beef. The price stabilization program
and its administration is a key factor in the determining beef imports
and protecting Japanese beef producers (Lloyd et al.).
Japanese—Beef—Trade Barriers. The government of Japan has
implemented a number of trade barriers to limit importation of
agricultural products. Barriers to importing beef limit quantities to
the extent that the domestic Japanese beef producers are afforded
considerable protection against relatively more efficient foreign
producers. These barriers include well-known categories such as
tariffs and quotas, plus the generic category of nontariff barriers
(NTBs). There is an ad valorem tariff (25 percent) imposed on all
imported fresh, frozen, chilled and boiled beef. The tariff has not
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been changed in any of the multilateral trade negotiations rounds or
bilateral trade negotiations. The LIPC also imposes certifications
standards on all imported beef. These standards add extra handling,
trimming and grading costs to importers.
In addition to the tariff and certification standards, the Japanese
beef industry is also protected by quotas. In Japan's case the quota
is probably the most important factor restricting imports
. Quota
tonnage for beef is determined by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (MAFF) after consultation with the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Livestock Industry
Promotion Corporation (LIPC) (United States Meat Export Federation,
1984).
Japan regulates beef imports with a general quota and four special
quotas. Australia supplies 69 percent of the general quota, the United
States 28 percent and New Zealand 3 percent. These shares are
equivalent to the LIPC share of the general quota (which is 90% of the
total)
.
The LIPC imports beef though public tenders which are issued
approximately once a month. The tenders are for grain- fed beef which
is supplied primarily from the United States, grass -fed beef supplied
mostly from Australia and New Zealand and other beef products.
The LIPC imports beef through several different systems. The
primary system (80% of the LIPC quota) is the "merchant system" where
the LIPC acts as the purchasing agent and requests competitive bids on
specific quantities and cuts of beef directly from importers licensed
to import beef into Japan. Foreign suppliers bid on LIPC tenders
through one of 36 Japanese importing companies which are granted
12
importing licenses from the MITI. These companies request competitive
bids from foreign suppliers to fill their share of the tender limit.
The LIPC then purchases the beef from the importers with the lowest
price subject to the company's ability to meet product specification
guidelines
.
The second procedure is the "one touch" system which was established
to promote the retail sale of imported chilled beef at reasonable
prices. Currently United States has only a ten percent share of
chilled beef imports (Gustafson, 1987). This system is used to supply
imported chilled beef to some 3000 retail stores in the Designated
Stores Program. Participating stores are authorized by the LIPC to
import a specified quantity of chilled beef from licensed importers.
These retail stores contact the licensed importing companies which
solicit bids from foreign suppliers. After the importer and retailer
agree on a price, the proposed deal is submitted to the LIPC which
inspects the beef, collects the payment plus a levy from the
participating store and pays the importer. The licensed importers
deliver directly to the Designated Stores Program participants thereby
reducing the LIPC's storage costs. The LIPC is trying to reduce the
share of beef imported under this system to increase its control over
imports (Gustafson)
.
The third major means available to the LIPC for importing beef is
the "modified tender" system. Under this system the LIPC purchases
imported beef for the Federation of All Japan Meat Retailers
Cooperative Association (Zennikuren)
. The LIPC purchases the beef from
the lowest priced licensed importer based upon each importers share of
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the import limit. "This system was instituted to establish a closer
match between domestic demand and imported beef" (Lloyd et al
. , pg.
28).
The fourth means by which the LIPC can fulfill its quota is the
"simultaneous buy and sell" system. This system excludes chilled beef
and was instituted by the LIPC in 1985 following the Japanese -United
States Beef Agreement (Lloyd et al.). Under this system, the LIPC
announces to user associations the maximum quantity they can offer in a
particular tender. User associations and foreign suppliers negotiate
price, quantity, specifications and type of beef. Bids and offers are
tendered to the LIPC. If the negotiated price agreements fall within a
designated price range, the tender will be accepted and notices issued
on buy/sell awards. The amount of beef imported under this system is
limited to 10 percent of LIPC's quota (Lloyd et al.).
The private quota, which is not controlled by the LIPC, consists of
approximately ten percent of the general quota. Approximately 70
percent of this quota is allocated to the 36 beef importers who are
obligated to sell to Zennikuren. Both frozen and chilled beef can be
imported but most imports consist of high quality cuts from the United
States. The remainder of the private quota goes to the Japan Ham and
Sausage Manufacturers Cooperative Association and the Japan Meat
Canners Cooperative Association on a two-to-one basis, respectively.
A number of special quotas, outside the control of the LIPC, have
been established to meet the needs of specific end users. The special
quotas amount to about 10 percent of beef imports and are distributed
as the Hotel, Okinawa, School Lunch and Boiled Beef quotas. Unlike the
14
general quota, the special quotas are not global and specific supplying
countries may be designated (Lloyd et al
.
) . The Hotel quota is
administered by the Japan Hotel Association and is currently dominated
by one United States packer (Gustafson)
. The Okinawa quota
administered by the Importers and Users Association for beef imports
only to Okinawa. The School Lunch quota is assigned to the Japan
School Lunch Association which supplies imported meat to the national
school lunch program from Australia. The Boiled Beef quota is
established to import beef for manufacturing use. Australia currently
fills most of this quota.
Summary. Quotas (except for special quotas) are not allocated to
specific countries, thus each country must compete for its share.
However, when quota specifications are for high quality beef, the
United States is favored since USDA grade prime and choice
automatically meet the requirements (Gustafson)
. Quota specifications
for chilled and lower quality beef favor the Australians who have a
cost advantage over the United States. Thus once the size of the
quota is established by the LIPC, negotiations between Japan and the
importing countries determine import trade shares. Agreements
stipulate the minimum amount of high quality beef which will be
imported under already established quotas. The United States fills
most of the high quality beef category leaving other countries less of
the general quota available to them. Intense negotiations concerning
beef trade between the United States and Japan increased high quality
beef imports under the general quota by 3,300 metric tons per year
15
until 1984 (Destler and Sato, 1982). In April 1984 the agreement was
extended to increase the total import quantity by 6 , 900 metric tons per
year to 58,400 metric tons by March 1988. (Lloyd et al
.
)
.
One would expect that the United States has gained market share from
the Australians given the recent bilateral agreement with Japan which
favors high quality beef imports. The extent to which recent trade
negotiations have favored the United States over the Australians will
be formally analyzed using Markov processes. This technique can be
used to determine if changes in market shares can be attributable to
trend or to trade negotiations.
16
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of the following literature review is to provide
background information for the current study of Japanese beef imports.
The reviewed literature is divided into three subsections specifically
concerned with Japanese beef markets, market share analysis techniques
and Markov processes. In the first subsection, the reader is given a
better understanding of Japanese livestock and meat markets. The second
subsection describes several different market share analysis
techniques, and the final subsection provides a detailed look at Markov
processes
.
Characteristics of the Japanese Beef Market. Japanese beef markets
have come under a great deal of attention from major beef exporting
nations in recent years. Japan's rapid growth in income and relatively
low per capita meat consumption have convinced exporters that
substantial market opportunities exist beyond current levels of trade.
According to Longworth (1983), dietary changes in Japan began to occur
in the mid-1950s and were especially apparent throughout the income
-
doubling decades of the 1960s and 1970s. The most dramatic of these
changes has been the growth in per capita consumption of livestock and
poultry products. Over the 20 year period from 1960 to 1980, per
capita consumption of eggs increased nearly 250 percent, milk and dairy
product consumption grew by almost 300 percent, and annual consumption
of meat increased by 450 percent. The growth in meat consumption
was not evenly divided among poultry, pork and beef. In 1955, 50
percent of the meat consumed in Japan was beef. By 1980, beef
17
consumption represented less than 20 percent of total meat consumption.
The high relative price of beef and its limited availability caused
beef consumption to become a smaller portion of total meat consumption.
During the period, Japanese production of pork and poultry kept a close
pace with demand, while beef production lagged demand by a substantial
margin. Formidable trade restrictions limited beef imports and nominal
prices increased more than twice as fast as prices of either pork or
poultry. Real prices of pork and poultry meat have actually declined
since 1960. Despite the price barrier and availability problems, per
capita beef consumption in Japan has continued to grow, indicating that
Japanese consumers have a strong desire for beef.
Japan's Agricultural Policy Research Committee (1986) acknowledged
that beef consumption is on the rise, but submitted that the current
import system had approval of the general populace. They also main-
tained that unlimited imports create confusion in the marketplace and
strike a heavy blow against domestic beef producers. The Japanese
government is firmly committed to the modernization of beef cattle
production and hopes to produce domestically as much of the nation's
consumption as is feasible. Japanese agricultural policies generally
reflect concern for food security and food price stability. Japanese
policy makers feel this philosophy is in line with policies of other
developed nations which also limit agricultural imports.
A number of economic researchers have sought to examine Japanese
markets with most research efforts directed to the explanation of
Japan's feed- livestock economy, meat consumption patterns, import
regulatory policies and potential for increased meat imports. Coyle
18
(1983) made an extensive examination of Japan's feed- livestock economy.
Included in this analysis is both historical and current developments
in the beef, pork, poultry, dairy and fishing industries. Coyle also
described domestic feed production in Japan and the continuing need for
imported feedstuffs
.
He made projections for Japanese production, and
imports were made based on current trends, government policies and
expected future development in the domestic livestock and feed sectors.
Coyle found the future consumption of livestock and poultry products
most dependent on continued income and population growth. Growth in
per capita consumption of red meat has increased faster than growth in
per capita consumption of fish and will continue to do so through 1990.
Fish remains the most important source of protein in the Japanese diet.
However, annual catch volume has remained relatively stable since 1972,
and real prices of fish have increased faster than for any other meat
product.
Coyle states that imports of beef and dairy products are likely to
increase while imports of pork and poultry will decline. Japan's
ability to expand beef and dairy production has been seriously limited
by the amount of land available for pasture and forage production.
Coyle predicted that self-sufficiency in beef will decline to about 50
percent by 1990 as a result of growing consumption, land constraints
and reduction in dairy cow numbers, due to increased per animal
productivity (currently, 70 percent of beef production in Japan comes
from dairy animals). In contrast, rapid structural changes have
occurred in the hog and poultry industries making Japan more competi-
tive in pork, poultry meat and egg production. Increased use of
19
confinement and concentration in pork and poultry production will keep
self-sufficiency in these products at or above 90 percent.
An explanation for dissimilar performance between the Japanese beef
sector and its hog and poultry industries was noted by Longmire (1984).
Longmire reasoned that technology associated with factory- like
production processes (such as confined feeding operations) are more
readily transferrable than production technologies utilizing extensive
land use and specialized labor. Coyle concluded that heavy dependence
on imported feedstuffs, both as preformulated feeds and bulk
commodities, will continue and the United States will remain an
important supplier. The Japanese government is highly committed to the
expansion of domestic forage production, but success in this area is
expected to be minimal.
A grain, oilseeds and livestock (GOL) model for Japan has been
developed by Liu (1985). Patterned after the United States GOL model,
this model is used to evaluate trends in Japan's grain, oilseeds and
livestock economy as well as for making projections under alternative
economic and policy assumptions. Liu's GOL model is an annual
simulation model which includes 19 agricultural commodities.
Simulation of production, consumption, stock changes, trade and prices
are included and explicit cross -price effects among commodities are
accounted for.
The model was simulated through the year 2000 (base simulation)
assuming a 0.5 percent annual increase in population, a 4.5 percent
yearly increase in per capita income, a 7.5 percent increase in the
consumer price index and all other price indices, and a 5.6 percent
20
increase in both the index cost of production and all crop input
prices. Continuation of current trade policies was also assumed, but
beef imports were allowed to increase at a rate of 5 percent per year.
A second simulation assumed identical conditions except that all
restrictions on beef imports (both tariffs and quotas) were removed.
Compared to the base, removal of all beef import restrictions caused
imports to more than double by 1990 and more than triple by 2000.
Domestic beef prices fell by 29 percent, but projected beef production
in Japan decreased by only 6 to 9 percent. Lower beef prices reduced
demand for all other livestock and dairy products as well as the need
for imported feed grains.
Using a simple demand-supply model for beef in Japan, Hayami (1979)
suggested a policy under which beef imports could be liberalized
without jeopardizing producer incomes or imposing a heavy burden on the
government budget. Williams (1985) reached a similar welfare con-
clusion using a proposed policy much like that of Hayami. Hayami 's
proposed policy used a system of deficiency payments and moderately
higher levy and tariff rates (550 yen per kilogram, compared to current
rates of 480 yen per kilogram)
, combined with abolition of all import
quota restrictions. The additional revenue generated from higher
import tax rates and increased import volumes could be redistributed to
beef producers in the form of deficiency payments, and domestic prices
would be maintained.
Welfare effects of such a policy were evaluated under assumption
that the price elasticity of beef demand (Eb) in Japan is either -1.5
or -1.0 (Eb = -1.5 represents an average of estimates from several
21
studies, while Eb = 1.0 is close to the minimum of all estimates).
Additionally, it was assumed that the program would be gradually phased
in over a six year period. Immediate and long term benefits were noted
under either elasticity assumption as deficiency payment costs were
more than covered by additional revenue generated from the import taxes
on imported beef. Both domestic beef production and beef prices rose
by the end of the period as world beef demand increased as a result of
greater Japanese purchases. The Japanese consumer was the major
beneficiary, enjoying an increase in consumer surplus of 300 to 400
billion yen (1.5 to 2.0 billion U.S. dollars). Net social welfare
increases ranged from 150 to 200 billion yen and exceeded by a wide
margin estimated administrative costs associated with deficiency
payment allocation.
Williams' (1985) evaluation of alternative Japanese import policies
proposed policy used a 48 -simultaneous equation, annual econometric
model of the Japanese livestock sector. Alternative policies included
the use of beef producer deficiency payments funded out of general tax
revenues and removal of all import quotas, a beef producer deficiency
payment funded by a 25 percent tax on beef imports and no quota, and a
25 percent import tax alone. The model was used to simulate effects
that such policies might have had if they had been in place during the
ten year period 1973 through 1982. Simulation results were compared to
actual figures to determine alternative policy impacts and as a basis
for assessing the impact of future policy changes.
Williams' analysis confirmed that Japanese import policies have
supported domestic Wagyu (indigenous Japanese beef cattle) production
22
through raising internal beef prices and that the U.S. share of
Japanese imports has been adversely effected.
The deficiency payment program, when funded from general tax
revenue, had little effect on Wagyu production, and cost $15. S. 1.3
billion for the ten year period. Beef imports would have likely been
2.0 metric tons per year higher under these conditions. The use of a
25 per cent import tax generated more than sufficient revenue to fund
the deficiency payment program, however, annual imports would have been
only 1.0 metric tons greater than actual import figures for the 1973 to
1982 period. Any abrupt policy change, such as abandonment of the
quota system (even with the 25 percent import tax maintained) would
cause Japanese beef prices to drop, likely forcing herd liquidation and
reducing domestic beef production. Phased liberalization was recom-
mended as the best alternative. A system which systematically reduced
the difference between world beef prices and Japanese beef prices,
after ten years, allowed imports to rise to the level of immediate
quota withdrawal while maintaining domestic cattle production.
Williams concluded that alternative policies which gradually allow
greater beef imports have little adverse impact on domestic beef
production and producer incomes in Japan.
Anderson (1983) concluded that policies such as those proposed by
Hayami and Williams are not likely to be implemented, because such
policies would transfer to beef producers much of the profits currently
received by the import agency and beef wholesalers. These profits have
been quite large ($U.S. 150 to 300 million annually), and may to quiet
a group that would otherwise lobby for fewer import restrictions.
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Currently, the Japanese government allows these middlemen to purchase
imported beef at world prices and then to receive a substantial markup
by selling domestically at protected price levels. According to
Anderson, any change in policy, such as abolition of quotas, that would
reduce profit margins for this group is likely to be met with resis-
tance
.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States intensified
pressure on Japan to liberalize agricultural import policies. Trade
negotiations were held between the two countries during the early
1980s. In 1984, an agreement known as the United States -Japan Beef and
Citrus Understanding was reached, and accusations from the United
States were temporarily abated. Under this agreement, the quantity of
high-quality beef imported by the Japanese was to be expanded by 6,900
tons per year (17 percent annual increase) during 1984 to 1987. This
rate is slightly faster than the 16 percent annual increase rate estab-
lished by a previous agreement for the period 1979 to 1983. Under a
similar agreement between Japan and Australia in 1984, the general beef
quota was expanded by 9,000 tons per year (6 percent) for 1984 to 1987
(up from 1,625 tons per year, 4 percent, for 1979 to 1983). Since
high-quality beef imports are subject to the general quota, the United
States -Japan agreement guarantees that 77 percent of the expansion in
the general quota will come in the form of high-quality beef of which
the United States is the largest supplier. The Japanese government
also committed themselves to facilitate of interactions between foreign
beef suppliers and domestic users. This commitment lead to the
initiation of the "Simultaneous Buy-Sell" system which allowed end
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users to negotiate directly or through the Japanese Livestock Industry
Promotion Council with foreign suppliers about beef product specifica-
tions and prices.
Coyle (1986) made an evaluation of the 1984 agreement and discussed
implications for the United States. Coyle provides historical
perspectives as a backdrop for his evaluation. Japanese concerns about
food self-sufficiency and food security were mentioned as underpinnings
to the nation's import policies. The United States was noted as viewing
Japanese quotas on beef and citrus products as symbolic of the broader
and ongoing problem of agricultural protectionism in Japan. Expanded
quotas provided by the agreement will likely add $35 to $45 million in
annual U.S. farm exports. However, Japanese beef imports will remain
about 30 to 60 percent of what they would be under free trade.
Mori (1986) criticized the Coyle's findings, stating that Coyle's
analysis was based on the assumption that any beef is beef in Japan.
Mori states that that assumption leads to an overestimation of the
degree to which Japan protects its domestic beef industry. Mori
submits, based on correlation of past price movements, that United
States "fed" beef is a different commodity than first grade Wagyu beef
and is probably not even a suitable substitute for second grade
Japanese dairy steer beef. Miyazaki (1986) supports Mori's conclusion
on the difference between United States "fed" beef and top grade Wagyu
beef, but equates U.S. beef to the medium grade of beef in Japan. This
grade includes 38 percent of all dairy steer beef (with most of the
remaining 62 percent falling in lower quality grades) and 44.9 percent
of all Wagyu beef. Hence, it is unclear exactly where U.S. beef falls
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with regard to quality in Japanese markets. This market is, apparently,
highly segmented (Mori, 1986) which may account for part of the price
differentials seen between imported and domestic beef.
Despite its many import restrictions, Japan remains one of the
largest and most stable foreign markets for United States livestock
products. The Japanese are the single most stable importer of United
States beef and veal exports, accounting for 65 percent of total United
States exports in beef and veal. Japan is also a leading importer of
United States livestock offal. With beef consumption increasing in
Japan and with import quotas gradually being reduced, Seng (1984)
believes substantial payoffs await United States beef exporters who are
willing to be committed to the Japanese market. As Asian Director of
the United States Meat Export Federation (a privately funded, not-for-
profit export enhancement organization)
, Seng notes several strategies
for increasing beef exports to Japan.
Foremost on the part of the exporting organization is a total
commitment to the Japanese market. The exporter must be particularly
committed to the development of market information and give similar
allegiance to marketing and promotion as well as production and
packaging. This commitment should be coherent and long-term in nature
as little will be accomplished with a sometime, short-term commitment.
Currently, Japanese import policies reduce the ability of United
States beef exporters to compete directly with other beef exporters on
the basis of price alone. Therefore, to the extent possible, the
United States should strive to distinguish its beef on the basis of
quality, innovation, packaging and promotion. Seng believes that the
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United States needs to ensure that its exports are perceived as a
consumer product rather than a commodity. Beef from the United States
does have several inherent strengths in the Japanese market, such as
relative leanness and lack of objectionable cooking odors as found in
some lower priced, imported meats. The high degree of sophistication
in the United States packing industry should provide the ability to
custom fabricate products to the Japanese market. It will also be
important to study product and service needs and specific export
opportunities in Japan, and to develop contacts with government trading
companies, wholesalers, retailers and end product users. According to
Seng, promotional efforts should be primarily directed to consumers and
distributors as enhancement of demand at these levels is imperative to
success
.
Market—Share Analysis Techniques. Several types of market share
analysis techniques can be found in recent economic literature. A
simple market share analysis technique is the calculation of market
share proportions for major sellers in a particular market coupled with
an evaluation and discussion of trends in each seller's market share.
Webb (1981) used this type of market share analysis to evaluate world
trade in major United States crops. A large part of Webb's study is
devoted to the presentation of the information using pie graphs, line
graphs and market share tables depicting trends in market shares over a
specified period of time. Discussion of the exporter's current market
position and trends which have occurred are also included in the
analysis. Policy, demand and supply related variables are utilized to
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explain observed positions and trends.
Linneman (1966) used a model in which the volume of trade of a
specific commodity between a certain exporter and importer was made
dependent on supply factors in the exporting nation, demand factors in
the importing nation and resistance factors which hinder trade between
the two countries. The model was designed to provide predictions when
exogenous forecasts of population and income growth are available.
This type of analysis has been called gravitational, because it looks
only at conditions in the trading countries and does not directly
consider conditions in competing exporter and importer nations. Lack
of disaggregated trade information have limited the use of
gravitational models in agricultural economic research.
The constant market share (CMS) approach has been used by Richardson
(1971), Rigaux (1971), and Konandreas and Hurtado (1978), and others,
to analyze historic agricultural trade patterns. Reseachers using CMS
models attempt to explain changes in trade flows according to changes
in total market growth, growth in individual import markets and changes
in preferential arrangements. The total change in exports is generally
written as a sum of three or four terms (depending on data
availability) which describe total and individual country growth and
bilateral trade agreements. Each one of the explanatory terms is
allowed to vary, while the remaining terms are held constant. Predic-
tions for future trade shares are based on historically observed
shares. The CMS approach is useful as a proxy for groups of aggregated
commodities, but it is inappropriate for individual agricultural
commodities due to the extreme volatility which exists in year to year
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market shares for the major exporters (McCalla and Josling, 1981).
A fourth type of analysis based on market shares and having pre-
dictive power is an adapted Markov process as first applied by Tesler
(1962). In the Markov model the market share of a certain exporter
during a given time period is said to be dependent upon the market
shares of all other exporters during the previous period (including the
specified exporters own market share from the previous period) . The
analysis results in the development of transition probabilities, which
denote the probability that the importer will switch from one exporter
to another. The markov model is generally considered and improvement
over the CMS method (McCalla and Josling, 1981), however, it may lose
accuracy as the forecasting period is extended (Howard, 1971). A
Markov model is used in the current study to analyze Japanese beef
imports. The final section of the literature review has been devoted to
a more detailed examination of Markov processes as it applies to
economics and, more specifically, to international trade.
Markov Processes. Dynamic economic models often describe the outcome
of certain variables as dependent upon the preceding value of the same
variable. First order Markov processes, which assume that current
values of economic variables depend only on the lagged value of the
same variable, can be applied to a wide spectrum of economic phenomena,
given that time ordered data is available. Markov models have been
used to evaluate the distribution of wages and income (Solow, 1951),
size distribution of firms (Judge and Swanson, 1962; Kottke, 1964) and
changes in market structure (Padberg, 1962; Farris and Padberg, 1964).
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A first order Markov process assumes
;
Sj(t) " p ij s i(t-l)>
or across all S^,
sj(t) = EPijSl(t-l),
i
where
;
S = the r states or possible outcomes; 1-1, 2,...n,
j = 1 , 2 , . . . n , and
Pjj = the transition probability denoting the prob
ability that the process will move from its
current state, S^, to another state, Sj , in the
next time period. Hence, P ij=Pr(Sj (t+l)/s i(t) )
•
Notice that because a finite, first order Markov process assumes a
fixed number of possible outcomes or states;
Pjj =1, and 0< Pjj < 1 for all Pjj .
When the Markov model is applied to economic data which includes the
actual number of movements S i(t) to Sj (t+1) for all i and j , the
maximum likelihood estimator for P-h is;
p ij - [ nij /£ njj]
i
where
,
nij = tne number of observed movements from S^ to Si
for all i and j
.
Padberg (1962) applied this model to the wholesale fluid milk
industry in California for the period 1950 to 1960. Judge and Swanson
(1962) used the same model to examine industry concentration of hog
producing firms in central Illinois from 1946 to 1958. In both
studies, estimates of transition probabilities were easily obtained,
because the actual number of movements from one state to each other
state was known. These researchers noted that under the assumption of
constant transitional relationships (constant over the estimation
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period)
,
a unique equilibrium for each system would eventually be
reached. This equilibrium was found to be independent of the initial
condition of the system, and was, therefore dependent only upon the
estimated transitional relationships.
Padberg demonstrated this outcome for an imaginary industry having
an initial configuration (Ctl ) of 100 firms in each of two catagories.
Supposing annual movement between catagories is described by the
transition probability matrix;
P = .6 .4
.3 .7
the expected industry configuration in the second time period (C t 2> is,
c t2 - C tiP = (100, 100) .6 .4 - (90, 100).
Likewise, the industry configuration in the third period is
given by;
Ct3 = Ct2 P = CtlP
2
= (90, 110) |- 6 * - (87, 113),
and it follows that,
Ctn = C tiP
n
.
As n approaches a positive infinity, Pn converges on a unique vector K,
which represents the final probability of being in each of the two
catagories. For Padberg' s example;
K = [.4268 .5714],
and equilibrium for the imaginary industry is;
CtlK - (100, 100) \-4286 -57141 (87.71, 114.29).
\.4286 .57141
The number of firms in each category will remain stable when equil-
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ibrium is reached, and this equilibrium occurs when category one
contains 88 firms and category two contains 114 firms. As mentioned,
this equilibrium is independent of initial industry configuration. Any
c tl when multiplied by the vector K will result in the same equilibrium
number of firms in each of the two catagories as long as the chosen
configuration involves the same total number of firms
.
A problem in applying a first order Markov model exists when
complete data concerning the individual movement between states is
unavailable for each successive time period within the time block to be
analyzed. Often only aggregate outcome data is available. This data
quantifies the proportion of the total population in each state during
each successive time period, but provides no detail about movement
between individual states.
Miller (1952) suggested that transition probabilities could be
estimated using ordinary least squares when such data limitations
exist. Adding an error term, uit , to the previously examined Markov
equation results in the multivariate linear model;
sj(t) = £ p ij s i(t-l) + ^it,
J
or in matrix form,
Sj - PSi + U,
where
,
Sj - a (Txl) vector of observations denoting the
proportion in state j at time t,
Si = a (Txr) matrix of observed proportions in state
i at time t-1,
P - a (rxl) vector of unknown transition prob
abilities,
U = a (Txl) vector of random disturbances, and
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T = the total number of successive time periods
involved.
As long as T > r, the least squares approach toward finding the
solution to the matrix form of the model is to find estimates, P^-s
,
for
Pjj such that U'U is minimized in the quadratic form of the equation;
U'U = (Sj - PS i)'(Sj - PSi).
There are, however, several problems associated with the estimation
of transition probabilities using ordinary least squares. Mandansky
(1959) pointed out that the disturbance terms, uit , do not all have the
same variance. Hence, the variance -covariance matrix associated with
these error terms does not satisfy the least squares assumption that
the variance -covariance matrix of the disturbance terms is equal to
o
rfj I. Violation of this assumption results in asymptotically ineffic-
iency among the estimates. Mandasky suggested a transformation of the
error terms to improve the efficiency of the estimates. However, there
is still no guarantee that the least squares estimates will meet the
required criterion;
£ Pij - 1 and p^ > 0.
J
Non-admissable estimates may appear, because individual least squares
estimates may be negative or greater than one. Goodman (1953) and
Tesler (1963) used ordinary least squares to estimate transition
probabilities, then made adjustments on the estimates which violated
the assumption < pjj < 1. The adjustment procedure consisted of
assigning the extreme permissable value to the inadmissable values and
a subsequent reestimation of the linear model. All negative estimates
were adjusted to zero, while all greater than one estimates were
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adjusted to unity. Iteration will be required when more than one
estimated transition probability must be adjusted. Further, due to the
number of possible alternatives when adjustments need to be made on
several estimates, adjustments must be made somewhat arbitrarily. It
seems reasonable that ordinary least squares could be utilized to find
estimates for the unknown transition probabilities, if the necessary
estimate restrictions could be imposed on the model. However, the
inequality constraint, < pjj < 1, is incompatible with the classical
Lagrangean approach to least squares minimization (Lee et al., 1965).
The equation,
U'U = (Sj - PSi)'(Sj - PSi) -
Sj'Sj - ZP'Si'Sj + P'Si'SiP,
appears as a quadratic form of P, and because the required constraints
on P are linear, the problem is solvable through quadratic programming.
This method provides a straightforward and objective means of deriving
admissable estimates for the unknown transition probabilities which
minimizes the total sum of squared errors (Lee et al .
, 1965). Theil
and Rey (1966) used a quadratic programming approach to estimate
transition probabilities for the changes in market shares held by three
cigarette brands from 1925 to 1943. Solving the quadratic form of the
markov model with no restrictions on the transition probability
estimates, Theil and Rey found that the required criterion p*.; = 1
J
J
was already satisfied. Therefore, imposition of this constraint was
not necessary. Several negative estimates did appear, however.
Restriction were imposed only on the violating estimates (negative
estimates were forced to zero) and the modified Lagrangean expression
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was subsequently solved.
The literature contains two economic studies that contain a quad-
ratic programming solution for an application of Markov processes to
international trade in agricultural commodities. Dent (1967) examined
the international wool flows which occurred during 1950 to 1964.
Nearly 20 years later, Wilson et al . (1986) analyzed importer buying
behavior for several major wheat importing countries. Both studies have
similar objectives and methodology to the author's analysis of Japanese
beef imports
.
Dent (1967) applied a first order Markov model to international wool
trade. A quadratic programming approach like that of Theil and Rey
(1966) was used to estimate transition probabilities for exporter
market shares of the total imports for each of seven major wool
importing nations. Dent suggested that the estimated transition
probabilities reflect importer buying loyalty toward individual
suppliers and give some idea to the extent of substitution between
exporters. Future buying paths for the importing countries was also
discussed. Dent makes use of the convergence vector or equilibrium
vector which exist under the assumption of constant transitional
relationships to explain probable future buying patterns for the
importers. He also noted that the impact any changes in the transi-
tional relationships which resulted from increased promotional efforts
or research developments could be quantified through alteration of the
appropriate transitional probabilities. Such alteration would change
the equilibrium vector and would alter the expected buying pattern of
the importer targeted by the promotional and research efforts.
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Wilson et al
.
(1986) used the Minos quadratic programming algorithm
(a quadratic programming computer package) to estimate transition
probabilities for exporter market share of the total imports of several
major wheat importing nations. Wilson et al. set out to characterize
importer loyalty toward individual suppliers and to use this informa-
tion to assess the extent of competition in the international wheat
market. Results indicated that wheat imports from different exporters
are rarely considered to be perfect substitutes, and that overall
market competitiveness is, therefore, reduced.
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METHODOLOGY
Transition probabilities are estimated for Japan's beef importing behavior.
Additionally, beef prices are compared between Japan's beef suppliers. The
methodology associated with the completion of these tasks is presented in this
chapter. The chapter is divided into two subsections. In the first
subsection, an application of Markov processes and the Minos quadratic program-
ming algorithm is used to estimate the desired transition probabilities. The
second subsection details the use of a paired t-test for comparison of beef
prices among the major Japanese beef suppliers.
Estimation of Transition Probabilities. Japan's loyalty toward its individual
beef suppliers can be estimated by Markov processes, if it is assumed that the
importer's decision concerning the choice of a beef supplier is governed by a
probabilistic mechanism. This assumption is reasonable, because there are a
finite number of beef exporting countries in the world, and because Japan must
choose at least one of them if beef is to be imported. Hence,
n
I[Pr(CSi)] = 1
i
where
,
PrCCSi) = the probability that the importer's choice of
supplier is country S ± ; 1-1, 2,...n, and n is
the finite number of nations which export beef.
It follows that;
< Pr(CSi) < 1, for each i,
and the likelihood that a particular supplier will be chosen can
be expressed by a stochastic process.
The stochastic process of a finite, first order Markovian probability model
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can be expressed;
PrCSt/S,-.!) = Pr(S t/S t . 1( St . 2 ,..,S )
where
,
S = the state or outcome of a particular event,
t = the time period associated with an event; (t-1)
represents the time period previous to t, and
PrCSt/St.i) and PrCSt/S^x, St . 2 ,..,S ) are
conditional probabilities for the outcome S t .
Outcomes S t and S t .^ are now more specifically defined to be the j th outcome at
time t, Sj( t ), and the ith outcome at time t-1, Si( t .i) , respectively, where
I - 1, 2,..,n and j - 1, 2,..,n. Statistical theory defines the joint proba-
bility of Sj( t) and S i(t . 1) as;
Pr(Sj(t) ,S i(t . 1) ) - Pr(S i(t . 1) )Pr(Sj(t) /S i(t . 1) ).
where
,
Pr ( s i(t-1)) ~ the unconditional probability for the
outcome Sj/ t _]\
.
Aggregation of this equation over i gives the unconditional probability for the
outcome S-j / t ) ;
n
Pr(Sj(t) ) = £Pr(S1(t . 1) )Pr(Sj(t)/Si(t . 1) )
i
where
,
Pr(Sj( t )) - the unconditional probability for
outcome Sw t \ .
The conditional probability, Pr(Sj (t)/si(t-l)) can be defined as the constant
transition probability associated with a change from S£( t_i) to Sw t \.
Rewriting the stochastic process as a Markovian Probability model;
n
sjt ~ ^ s it-l p ij
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where
,
Sjt " Pr ( Sj(t)).
s it-l = Pr (Si( t -l). and
P ij = Pr ( Sj(t)/Si( t -l).
For the purpose of this study, the outcomes of interest are the annual
market shares held by individual nations exporting beef to Japan from 1960 to
1985. Japan's major beef suppliers are Australia, New Zealand and the United
States. At no time during 1960 to 1985 did the remainder of beef exporting
countries hold a combined share of more than a 10.5 percent of Japanese beef
imports. Therefore, market shares for Australia, New Zealand, the United
States and a fourth supplier designated "ROW" or "rest of the world" are
included in the analysis. Both market share of the total quantity of Japanese
beef imports and market share of the total value of beef imports are evaluated.
The Markov probability model is applied to the data (Appendix 1) of exporter
market share of Japanese beef imports.
To estimate the unknown transition probabilities, Pjj
,
an error term, ut , is
added and the Markov model is re-written in terms of exporter market shares;
n
Mjt - IMlt -lPij + ut
i
where
,
Mit-1 ~ tne market share of country i at time t-1,
Mj t = the market share of country j at time t,
i = 1 , 2 , . . r , and j - 1 , 2 , . . r
.
The appropriate estimates for Pjj minimize the sum of squared errors, y2 in the
equation; t
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nu2 - (Mj t - rMlt . 1P1J )2 f
subject to the required constraints;
(A) P tj = 1 for all i, and
(B) < Pjj < 1 for all i and j
.
The Minos quadratic programming algorithm (Muntagh and Suanders , 1977) is
used to derive the estimates for Pjj . Minos provides for the use of both
equality and inequality constraints, so the appropriate constraints (A) and (B)
are applied. A systems r-square is calculated as a proxy to the fit the esti-
mates provide.
Comparison of Beef Prices. A paired t-test (Snedecor and Cochran, 1980) is
used to determine whether or not Japan paid different prices for beef to its
different beef suppliers over the period 1960 to 1985. The t- statistic for a
paired t-test is given as;
t - [<Xi - Xj) - <Ui - uj)]/sxi . xj
where
,
Xi and Xj are the mean beef prices Japan paid to
country l and country j , respectively,
(ui - u-j) - the hypothesized difference between
the price paid to country i and the price paid to
country j , and
sxi-xj " tne calculated sample estimate for the
standard error of the difference (X^-X^)-
As a first step toward the calculation of a t-statistic, the mean and
standard deviation of annual beef prices are calculated for each of the four
suppliers: Australia, New Zealand, United States and the ROW. The data used
for these calculation details annual average beef price data for each supplier
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from 1960 to 1985 (Appendix 3). For calculation of the t-statistic, (u^ - u-)
is set equal to zero for all i and j . This is consistent with the hypothesis
that no difference exists between the beef prices paid to any two of Japan's
beef suppliers. Consequently, if the t-statistic is sufficiently large the
hypothesis of no price difference can be rejected with a known degree of
confidence. A t-statistic is calculated for each of the six possible pairs of
Japan's major four beef suppliers. The t-statistic has 2(n-l) degrees of freedom.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Japan is one of the major beef importing nations in the world.
Results presented in Tables Rl and R2 summarize Japanese beef importing
behavior from 1960 to 1985. Diagonal elements (P^s) of the transition
probability matrices represent Japan's loyalty toward its individual
beef suppliers. Loyalty is the greatest where the P^'s are large and
close to one. A high degree of buyer loyalty indicates that the
probability of repeat purchases are high. Diagonal transition
probabilities quantify the portion of an exporter's market share during
a given year which was derived from the market share held by the same
exporter the previous year. From Table Rl, 99.2 percent of Australia's
market share in beef quantity in a given year originated from
Australian's own market share holding during the previous year.
Only 79.2 percent of New Zealand's market share comes from that
country's share the previous year. Similar results are illustrated in
Table R2 for Japanese beef import values.
Off-diagonal elements (Pijs) of the transition probability matrices
quantify the portion of country j's share which originates from a
portion of country i's share from the previous year. For example
from Table Rl, 1.7 percent of Australia's market share in a given year
comes from a part of the United States' market share in the previous
year. Additionally, 0.8 percent of the United States current market
share came from part of the market share New Zealand held the previous
year.
If ?ij ~ Pjii imported beef from countries i and j is highly substi-
tutable and competition is great between the two exporting countries.
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Neither country i or country j will increase its own share at the
expense of its competitor, because annual losses and gains in market
share between the two countries are exactly offsetting. Country j
TABLE Rl: Transition Probabilities for Exporter Market
Share of Japanese Beef Imports in Quantity
(1960 - 1985).
U.S. AUS. N.Z. ROW
systemU.S. .983 .017
AUS.
.992 .008
r- square = .712
N.Z. .020 .009 .792 .179
ROW .015
.026 .959
TABLE R2: Transition Probabilities for Exporter Market
Share of Japanese Beef Imports in Value
(1960 - 1985).
U.S. AUS. N.Z. ROW
U.S. .976 .024 system
AUS.
.989 .011
r- square == .695
N.Z. .043 .003 .786 .168
ROW .017
.073 .910
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gains in market share at the expense of country i when Pj^ > P-H,
because country j's annual losses in market share to country i are not
offset by the annual share which country j takes from country i.
Importer bias may cause a difference in Pjj and Pj^, and such a bias
reduces competition between the exporting countries.
Telser (1964) indicated that transition probabilities are a function
of relative prices, product quality and promotion. Additionally,
political and institutional relationships between exporter and importer
will also influence transition probabilities. A buyer will favor
imports from a country maintaining low relative prices and acceptable
quality. However, political and institutional factors, which often
culminate in bilateral agreements, produce directional forces in the
market. These forces may work in the same direction or opposite to
price and quality factors, and, as a result, the market position of an
individual exporter may improve or deteriorate.
To determine the degree of loyalty which Japan holds for each of its
beef suppliers, diagonal elements of the transition probability
matrices can be compared to similar estimates made by Wilson et al.
(1986) and Dent (1967). For Japanese beef imports, both quantity and
value, P11( P2 2 and P44 are greater than 0.90. In analyzing buyer
behavior for an aggregate of major wheat importers, Wilson et al. noted
that the largest estimated F^ value was 0.96. Among individual wheat
importers the largest Pj^ value was 0.72, while remaining diagonal
transition probability estimates ranged from 0.68 to 0.19. Wilson et
al. considered any estimate above 0.60 as an indicator of strong buyer
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loyalty. Dent's analysis of international wool flows produced re-
values which ranged from zero to 0.96. Transition probabilities were
estimated for seven major wool importing nations, and five of 42 Pj*
estimates were greater than 0.70.
Withstanding the lack of other studies for comparison, there is
little doubt that the Pu 's for Japanese beef imports indicate that the
Japanese are loyal to Australia and the United States as foreign beef
suppliers. Australia and the United States are the two largest
shareholders in the Japanese imported beef market, and both countries
appear to have a very strong hold on the market. Interpretation of the
diagonal estimate corresponding to the ROW is more difficult due to its
undefined identity. Japan is committed to the continued patronage of
beef exporting countries other than Australia, New Zealand and the
United States, but only in relatively small amounts.
Japan is less loyal to New Zealand as a foreign beef supplier
(P33 = .79 for both quantity and value). New Zealand's share of
Japanese beef imports declined substantially over the evaluated period,
1960 to 1985 (Appendix 4). However, rapid growth in Japanese beef
imports allowed New Zealand's volume of beef exports to increase
slightly despite its rapid loss of market share. Though New Zealand
has not been sought as a major beef Japanese beef supplier in recent
years, Japan continues to demonstrate a fairly strong degree of loyalty
to this country.
Figure Dl illustrates the dominant trade flow directions among
Japan's beef suppliers. Examination of the off diagonal transition
probabilities provides information for the figure. Each of Japan's
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/ UNITED STATES
ROW-
\
AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
Figure D1: Net Market Share Flows Among
Japan's Foreign Beef Suppliers.
suppliers are paired. The arrow between each pair of suppliers has
been directed toward the country which annually receives a larger
portion of its market share from the nation with which it is paired
than it gave up to that same nation. A solid line is used to
illustrate even trade flows between Australia and New Zealand, because
neither country had a net gain in market share from the other country.
The dotted line between Australia and the ROW indicates that trade did
not flow in either direction between the two countries.
Figure Dl can be compared to the graph of the market shares of all
four Japanese beef suppliers from 1960 to 1985 (Figure D2)
. There is
considerable agreement between these two illustrations, but several
discrepancies also exist. Figure Dl shows Japanese beef trade flowing
to New Zealand from the United States. Such movement is not apparent
on the market share graph. Prior to 1972, New Zealand's market share
decreases, and the United States share remains negligible. After 1972,
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New Zealand's share continues to decline, while the United States share
increases rapidly.
Transition probability estimates in Figure Rl and R2 indicate that
trade flows from the ROW to New Zealand occurred during the evaluation
period. Trade flows in this direction are not apparent in Figure D2.
From 1960 to 1967, New Zealand's market share falls while the ROW's
share increases. After 1967, New Zealand's share declines further, but
the ROW's share does not increases appreciably.
The lack of trade flow between Australia and the ROW as indicated in
Figure Dl is also seen in the market share graph. The market shares of
Australia and the ROW essentially trend together throughout the 25 year
evaluation period. Both countries' market shares showed mostly
increases during the 1960s, then remained constant or declined during
the 1970s and early 1980s. Australia did lose a substantial portion of
its market share after 1972, but the ROW did not obtain any of
Australia's loss.
The market share graph is less clear in illustrating trade flows
from the United States to the ROW. Any trade flow between these two
suppliers has been minute as indicated by the magnitude of the transi-
tion probabilities P14 and P41 in Tables Rl and R2 . During the 1970s
and 1980s, the United States share was growing rapidly, but very little
of this increase could have come from ROW share losses, because the ROW
share averaged less than two percent of the total market during the
period.
Figure Dl indicates that transition probabilities which describe
market share flows between New Zealand and Australia are almost exactly
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offsetting (near pairwise- symmetry exists between P23 and P32 in both
Table Rl and Table R2)
. In a given year, New Zealand will likely
obtain exactly the same portion of its market share from Australia that
Australia will obtain from New Zealand. This offsetting exchange which
results in a zero net flow of market share apparently disagrees with
the market share graph. Clearly, from 1960 to 1964 and from 1969 to
1972, Australia gained substantial market share at the expense of New
Zealand. From 1972 onward, the market shares of both countries trend
downward. Hence, it is unclear where New Zealand makes gains at
Australia's expense to offset its earlier losses to Australia. A
possible explanation is the two year rebound in market share New
Zealand made during 1965 and 1966. This rebound came almost solely
from losses in the Australian share.
Market shares trade flows between the United States and Australia
from Figure Dl are easy to reconcile with the market share graph. The
estimated transition probabilities depict a net flow in market share
from the Australia to the United States. In viewing the market share
graph, the occurrence of such trade flows are readily apparent after
1972. During the years when Australia's share of Japanese beef imports
grew dramatically (1960 to 1972), the United States held too small a
share to contribute to Australian increases. From 1972 to 1985, the
United States share has grown substantially, and particularly after
1978, growth in the United States share has come almost entirely at the
expense of Australia.
Estimated transition probabilities for exporter market share of
Japanese beef imports from 1975 through 1985 (Table R3 and R4)
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TABLE R3: Transition Probabilities for Exporter Market
Share of Japanese Beef Imports in Quantity
(1975 - 1985).
U.S. AUS. N.Z. ROW
U.S. .94 .04 0.2
AUS.
.97 .03
N.Z.
.04 .96
ROW .008
.992
TABLE R4: Transition Probabilities for Exporter Market
Share of Japanese Beef Imports in Value
(1975 - 1985).
U.S. AUS. N.Z. ROW
U.S. .815 .085
AUS. .02 .98
N.Z. .024 .033 .162 .781
ROW .001
.998
generally agree with transition probabilities estimated for the entire
1960 to 1985 period (Table Rl and R2)
. Japan's loyalty toward
Australia, the United States and ROW was strong during the 1975 to 1985
period. However, Japanese loyalty to New Zealand has decreased since
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the 1960s and early 1970s. Tables R3 and R4 show that a large portion
of New Zealand's annual share of Japan's beef imports was obtained from
ROW share holdings the previous year.
Transition probabilities from the shortened evaluation period show
net share flows from Australia to the United States, from the United
States to the ROW (though small) and from the United States to New
Zealand (value share only)
. These net share movements agree with those
seen in Tables Rl and R2
. Transition probabilities from the shortened
period also show no share movement in either direction between
Australia and the ROW, which agrees with estimates from the full length
evaluation period.
As expected, transition probability estimates from the 1975 through
1985 period show a larger net share movement from Australia to the
United States. This agrees with the market share graph (Figure D2)
which shows the United States' share of Japanese beef imports rising
rapidly during the late 1970s and 1980s, while Australia's share fell
substantially. This time period coincides with both the 1978 and 1984
United States - Japan bilateral beef trade agreements which effectively
biased the Japanese beef import market toward high-quality beef. The
United States clearly increased its market share greatly during this
period and some of this increase must be attributed to changes in the
political-economic relationship between the United States and Japan.
Beef Price Comparison. Results from the beef price comparison among
Japan's foreign beef suppliers support the authors hypothesis that the
Japanese view United States beef as distinct from the beef imported
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from Australia and New Zealand (Tables R5 and R6) . The mean beef price
paid for United States beef from 1960 to 1985 was 917,500 yen per
kilogram, while beef prices paid to Australia and New Zealand during
the same period averaged 445,000 yen per kilogram and 480,800 yen per
kilogram, respectively. The United Sates mean price is significantly
different from both the Australian beef price (p < .115) and the New
Zealand beef price (p < .144). Thus, a statement concerning the
existence of a price difference between both the United States and
Australia and the United States and New Zealand
can be made with greater than 85 percent confidence. This price
difference coupled with the difference in quality (marbling) between
United States beef exported to Japan and beef from Australia and New
Zealand, indicates that beef imported from the United States is not a
close substitute for beef from either Australia or New Zealand in the
Japanese market. Further evidence to support this view is found in the
fact that the market for domestically produced beef in Japan is highly
segmented, with the quantity of marbling present in the beef as the
primary determinant in this segmentation (Mori, 1986).
The smallest difference in mean imported beef prices among Japan's
beef suppliers is the price difference found between Australia and New
Zealand. This difference is not significant (p > .25), so Japan
essentially pays the same price for beef imported from these two
suppliers. Beef from Australia is apparently quite similar in quality
to beef from New Zealand, and the two are viewed as near perfect
substitutes in the Japanese market. The previously discussed pairwise
symmetry exhibited in the market share transition probabilities for
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Table R5
.
Mean Annual Beef Price Received by Japan's Major
Beef Suppliers over the Period 1960 to 1985.
Beef Supplier Mean Beef Price
(1000 yen/metric ton)
United States 917.5
Australia 445.0
New Zealand 480.8
ROW 610.0
Table R6
.
Statistical Results from a Comparison of Mean
Beef Prices Among Japan's Major Beef Suppliers.
Suppliers
Compared
t-statistic Probability that
Hq is true 1
U.S. - AUS. 1.231 < .115
U.S. - N.Z. 1.101 < .144
U.S. - ROW .851 < .200
AUS. - N.Z. -.327 > .250
AUS. - ROW -.618 > .250
N.Z. - ROW -.436 > .250
1. The hypothesis of zero price difference
is designated HO.
Australia and New Zealand also indicate that imported beef from these
two countries are readily substituted.
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It is less clear how beef from the ROW is perceived in Japan. The
mean price of beef paid to the ROW for the evaluated period was 610,000
yen per kilogram. A price not significantly different from the mean
beef price of any of the other three suppliers. This result may be due
to the composition of the ROW, which is made up of several suppliers
exporting different qualities of beef.
Interpretation of both transition probability results and mean price
differences is essential in assessing the overall competitiveness of
the Japanese market for imported beef. Commodity differences and the
lack of substitutability between the United States and Australia
(Japan's two major beef suppliers) tend to greatly reduce the competi-
tiveness of Japanese beef markets. Though the primary product (a beef
calf) is the same for both suppliers, each suppliers eventual transfor-
mation of the primary product results in the production of different
end products for export. The transformation essentially decides
whether the final exported product will fall into either the "fed" or
"nonfed" beef market in Japan. Natural resources and historical
production methods undoubtedly influence the path of product transfor-
mation in both Australia and the United States. The United States,
with inexpensive and abundant grain supplies coupled with a highly
capitalized cattle feeding industry is likely to continue producing
"fed" beef for export. In contrast, Australia with smaller grain
supplies and abundant rangeland will be apt to export almost entirely
"nonfed" beef.
Beef imported from both countries is subject to Japan's general beef
quota. Australian beef and United States beef do compete to fill this
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annual quota. However, beef from the United States is also subject to
a high quality beef agreement which represents a fixed portion of the
general quota. The United States essentially has no competition for
the filling of the high quality beef agreement. As mentioned, Japan
has expanded the high quality beef quota at a faster rate than the
general quota has been expanded. In doing this the Japanese have
essentially biased the market toward the United States. Such action
may be a response to political pressure the United States has placed on
Japan to increase agricultural imports from the United States. Japan
seems inclined to respond to pressure of this type, because United
States markets are extremely important to Japanese industrial exports.
Australia is a less important source of export revenue for Japan. It
is apparently more beneficial for the Japanese government to take
actions which quiet the political cries of the United States, than to
expand its general beef quota at a rate that would allow Australia to
compete evenly with the United States.
Strong competition could potentially exist between Australia and
New Zealand. Beef exported from New Zealand readily substitutes for
Australian beef in the Japanese market. However, Australia holds a
much larger share of Japanese beef imports, and receives a greater
degree of loyalty from the importer. New Zealand has adequate produc-
tion and export volumes of beef to be a major Japanese supplier. Yet,
in recent years, New Zealand can only be considered as a minor source
of imported beef to Japan. Australia's dominance in the market makes
it doubtful that competition between these two countries is as strong
as the highly substitutable beef products from these countries would
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indicate.
Only weak competition between New Zealand and the United States
exists in the Japanese market for imported beef. Beef imported from
New Zealand does not readily substitute for beef imported from the
United States. Like Australia, New Zealand has virtually no access to
the volume of allowable imports within the high quality beef quota.
Japan is more loyal to the United States as a beef supplier, and this
has undoubtedly enabled the United States to increases its market share
at New Zealand's expense.
The amount of competition which exists between the ROW and Japan's
three other beef suppliers is difficult to assess. There is apparently
some substitutability between ROW beef and beef from each of the other
important suppliers. However, the ROW holds only a very small share of
Japanese beef imports, and it is doubtful that any single nation within
the ROW can seriously compete with Australia, New Zealand and the
United States for Japanese beef imports.
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CONCLUSIONS
Japan is a major importer in the world beef market. Australia and
the United States are Japan's major beef suppliers. New Zealand is a
minor beef supplier to Japan. All other beef exporting nations
combined hold a very small share of Japan's beef import market. The
Japanese are extremely loyal to Australia and the United States as
suppliers of foreign beef. Importer loyalty of this type manifests in
a high probability of repeat purchases from the same supplier. Japan
is loyal to New Zealand as a minor beef source. However, supplier
loyalty toward New Zealand is not as strong as loyalty to either
Australia or the United States, and has decreased in the past decade.
Japan pays a higher price for "fed" beef from the United States than
for "nonfed" beef from either Australia or New Zealand. In the
Japanese market, beef imported from the United States is essentially
viewed as a different commodity than beef imported from either Austra-
lia or New Zealand. As a result, United States beef does not substi-
tute well with Oceanic beef. Australian beef and New Zealand beef are
viewed as close substitutes in Japanese market.
Only a weak degree of competition exists among Japan's foreign beef
suppliers. A lack of substitutability between beef from Japan's major
beef suppliers greatly reduces competition in the market. The United
States is virtually guaranteed the quantity allowed in the high-quality
(highly-marbled) beef agreement, because Australia and New Zealand's
exports are almost entirely low-quality (lowly-marbled) beef. Recent
expansion of the high-quality beef quota at a faster rate than
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expansion of the general quota has biased the market in favor of high-
quality beef. Hence, the political-economic relationship between Japan
and the United States has fueled the increase in the U.S. share of
Japanese beef imports.
Competition between Australia and New Zealand could potentially be
strong as indicated by the highly substitutible exports from these
countries. However, Japan's extreme loyalty to Australia as a major
beef supplier coupled with the fact that New Zealand holds only a
minute share of the total market, makes it unlikely that strong
competition exists between the two exporters. Beef exporters other
than the United States, Australia and New Zealand will have extreme
difficulty penetrating the Japanese imported beef market. Substantial
increases in market share are unlikely for such countries, because of
Japan's extreme loyalty toward its major suppliers.
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APPENDIX 1
Exporter Market Share of Japanese Beef
Imports (Quantity)
Year U.S. Aus
.
N.Z. ROW
1960 0.008 0.487 0.504 0.001
1961 0.001 0.512 0.482 0.004
1962 0.006 0.587 0.366 0.04
1963 0.723 0.241 0.036
1964 0.846 0.13 0.024
1965 0.001 0.719 0.238 0.043
1966 0.003 0.693 0.244 0.061
1967 0.001 0.721 0.173 0.105
1968 0.003 0.743 0.17 0.084
1969 0.005 0.809 0.165 0.021
1970 0.016 0.866 0.108 0.01
1971 0.012 0.889 0.096 0.002
1972 0.011 0.915 0.067 0.007
1973 0.075 0.843 0.074 0.008
1974 0.144 0.79 0.055 0.011
1975 0.079 0.826 0.078 0.017
1976 0.126 0.817 0.049 0.007
1977 0.087 0.852 0.046 0.015
1978 0.129 0.775 0.077 0.018
1979 0.187 0.768 0.027 0.018
1980 0.191 0.755 0.032 0.022
1981 0.223 0.704 0.05 0.023
1982 0.261 0.702 0.03 0.007
1983 0.274 0.662 0.056 0.008
1984 0.29 0.631 0.042 0.027
1985 0.301 0.631 0.044 0.024
Source: "The Livestock Industry Data Book",
MERC Staff Report No. 6-85, May 1985.
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APPENDIX 2
Exporter Market Share of Japanese Beef
Imports (Value)
Year U.S. Aus
.
N.Z. ROW
1960 0.012 0.503 0.484 0.001
1961 0.003 0.522 0.467 0.008
1962 0.001 0.577 0.33 0.083
1963 0.692 0.233 0.075
1964 0.84 0.118 0.042
1965 0.002 0.687 0.233 0.079
1966 0.003 0.673 0.209 0.114
1967 0.003 0.648 0.155 0.195
1968 0.014 0.693 0.144 0.149
1969 0.024 0.777 0.164 0.035
1970 0.061 0.81 0.113 0.015
1971 0.036 0.877 0.079 0.008
1972 0.026 0.89 0.061 0.022
1973 0.112 0.815 0.066 0.066
1974 0.191 0.748 0.053 0.008
1975 0.21 0.688 0.083 0.019
1976 0.24 0.698 0.053 0.009
1977 0.159 0.756 0.065 0.02
1978 0.213 0.691 0.075 0.02
1979 0.242 0.71 0.028 0.02
1980 0.248 0.695 0.038 0.019
1981 0.283 0.639 0.056 0.022
1982 0.35 0.61 0.033 0.07
1983 0.326 0.611 0.058 0.005
1984 0.311 0.612 0.053 0.024
1985 0.323 0.623 0.035 0.018
Source: "The Livestock Industry Data Book",
MERC Staff Report No. 6-85, May 1985.
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APPENDIX 3
Average Annual Price Paid by Japan for
Imported Beef by Exporting Country from
1960 to 1985 (1000 yen/metric ton).
Year U.S. Aus
.
N.Z. ROW
1960 291 206 192 180
1961 315 209 199 407
1962 288 187 172 388
1963 — 173 175 381
1964 360 211 195 362
1965 720 220 225 423
1966 370 274 241 530
1967 1620 319 316 654
1968 1554 326 295 622
1969 1410 293 303 520
1970 1355 323 362 529
1971 1139 384 321 1215
1972 984 413 388 1397
1973 945 609 559 546
1974 975 694 711 551
1975 1325 415 526 574
1976 1014 453 570 640
1977 799 387 616 585
1978 762 412 449 510
1979 885 632 731 751
1980 1053 746 953 707
1981 913 653 816 684
1982 1071 694 880 811
1983 918 712 795 530
1984 859 693 724 656
1985 1013 932 786 708
Source: "The Livestock Industry Data Book",
MERC Staff Report No. 6-85, May 1985.
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Japan is a major participant in the world beef market. In this
study, Japan's loyalty toward its individual beef suppliers is measur-
ed, imported beef prices are compared between suppliers and competition
among suppliers is assessed. An adapted Markov processes market share
model is used to develop transition probabilities for Japan's major
beef suppliers, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and a fourth
supplier, the ROW or "rest of the world". Transition probabilities
quantify Japan's loyalty toward individual beef suppliers. Beef prices
are compared between all suppliers via a paired t-test.
Results indicate that Japan is extremely loyal to its two largest
suppliers, Australia and the United States. Japan is also very loyal
to the ROW, however, only a very small share of Japan's total beef
purchases come from the ROW. Japanese loyalty toward New Zealand was
fairly strong during the 1960s and early 1970s, but loyalty toward this
supplier decreased greatly during the late 1970s and 1980s. New
Zealand exports more beef to Japan than does the ROW, but New Zealand
is still only a minor beef source for Japan.
The Japanese pay a higher price for beef imported from the United
States than for beef imported from either Australia or New Zealand.
This fact is consistent with highly-marbled beef from the United States
being viewed by the Japanese as a different commodity than the
lowly-marbled beef from either Australia or New Zealand. No price
difference was found between Australian and New Zealand beef, indicat-
ing that these two products are viewed as near-homogeneous in the
Japanese market. The price for ROW beef was not statistically dif-
ferent from the beef price of any of Japan's other three suppliers,
which may be due to fact that several different countries make up the
ROW. Apparently, Japan receives a mix of both highly-marbled and
lowly-marbled beef from the ROW.
Only weak competition exists among Japan's imported beef suppliers.
Beef from the two largest suppliers, Australia and the United States,
are poor substitutes as indicated by perceived commodity differences.
Further, Japan's bilateral agreement with the United State concerning
high-quality (highly-marbled) beef essentially guarantees that the
United States' exports will fill a fixed portion of the general beef
quota. Recent expansion of the high-quality beef quota at a faster
rate than the general quota has further biased the market in favor of
the United States.
Competition between Australia and New Zealand could potentially be
strong as indicated by the high substitutability between beef from
these two exporters. However, New Zealand holds such a small share od
the current Japanese market that it seems doubtful that Australia is
challenged to any great extent by New Zealand. Likewise, the ROW plays
only a small role in the Japanese imported beef market and provides
little competition for either Australia or the United States.
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